particularly susceptible in an intentional terrorist event. Though there are many directives and plans in place to protect the country in case of an agroterrorist event, there are still some areas of concern. Communication and coordination are the primary concerns. In an emergency response in agriculture there are many organizations and governmental agencies responding. In past natural incidents, such as food borne illness, there was much confusion about what roles each group should play. This manuscript will evaluate the steps that have been taken to ensure a more coordinated response in the event of an agricultural incident, and why the "lessons learned" are repeated. In addition, recommendations for reducing repeated errors in coordination are proposed.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION IN THE CASE OF AN INTENTIONAL AGROTERRORIST INCIDENT
Agriculture in the United States has a tremendous importance in the economic well being of the country. U.S. agriculture generates more than $1 trillion in economic activity, $50 billion of which comes from exports. 1 The share of U.S. agricultural products sold overseas is more than double that of other U.S. industries. 2 An estimated 15% of the population is employed directly or indirectly by agricultural activities and the productivity and efficiency of food production in the U.S. relates to the significantly smaller percentage of income Americans spend on food compared to the rest of the world. 3 Agriculture accounts for almost 13% of the nation's Gross national product. 4 The United States government recognized the importance of agriculture, including food production, to this country when it was recognized as part of the nation's critical infrastructure and key resources and was included in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and the National Response Framework.
Agroterrorism is defined by the Congressional Research Service "as the deliberate introduction of an animal or plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing economic losses, and/or undermining social stability." 5 The National Response
Plan has determined that a food and agricultural incident may threaten public health, animal nutrition, food production, aquaculture, livestock production, wildlife, soils rangelands, and agricultural water supplies. 6 Some experts do not include food as a target of agroterrorism, but because an attack on livestock or plant crops will severely affect food production, and the government categorizes food and agriculture together, for this review food security will be included as a possible component of agroterrorism. There are many ways agriculture is susceptible to terrorist attacks. Farms are generally unsecured areas that make it difficult to prevent parts of them from being intentionally contaminated. In addition, livestock is often concentrated in relatively small areas as part of the finishing process. For example, cattle are often sent to feedlots prior to slaughtering, and these are concentrated in the central United States. The top three hog producing states produce over 50% of U.S. hogs. 9 This makes a large portion of the industry susceptible to smaller amounts of contaminants.
There are a large number of contagious biological agents that can affect animals and plants. Most of these do not affect humans, but they are often endemic in the environment somewhere in the world, so they can be easily accessed and cultured with relatively little danger to the person performing the procedure. These agents can be deployed with little effect to the person deploying it. Because the United States has eradicated many of the diseases endemic in other areas of the world, many veterinarians and scientists are less able to recognize a manifestation of a foreign animal or plant disease.
In the production of animals, plants and foods, live and raw products are often comingled with processed products in the transportation and production processing system. This can increase the speed of contamination of the food supply, overcoming natural barriers. Because international trade is often based on the disease-free status of the commodity, even a rumor of possible contamination can lead to trade embargoes, 4 a drop in domestic consumption, disruption in commodities markets, and often takes months or years to recover.
Most experts believe that the primary impact of an agroterrorist incident would be economic. The direct costs are related to the expense involved in containment of the disease, eradication, compensation and lost production. Indirect costs are related to losses experienced by agriculturally dependent businesses, such as farm suppliers, grocery retailers, and the restaurant industry. As mentioned previously, a large amount of U.S. agricultural income relies on exportation of product to other parts of the world. If embargoes are in place, not only can the U.S. economy be affected, but also the potential exists for food prices in some developing countries to be affected. This might result in political unrest in that nation with the potential for impacting U.S. national security.
In the event of an agroterrorist incident in the U.S., political upheaval could result from a lack of consumer confidence in the ability of the government to protect them. In addition, the eradication and disposal of large numbers of animal carcasses can lead to a negative political response if not handled appropriately. From a terrorist's perspective, the best result of intentional contamination of an agricultural product is the fear that would result, possibly undermining social stability.
An example of how an agricultural incident in the U.S. can effect national security was seen when South Korea erupted into riots and political upheaval as the USDA and the South Korean government negotiated the resumption of the sale of U.S. beef in the country after S. Korea had banned imports due to the presence of bovine spongiform encephalitis (BSE) in an animal in the United States. Bovine spongiform encephalitis is 5 very rarely spontaneously produced in cattle and is transmitted primarily by ingestion of contaminated feed. It is a disease that progresses slowly and is only seen in animals over 30 months old, much older than most cattle used in meat production. Ingestion by humans of meat products contaminated with BSE is connected to the development of a variant of a human disease similar to BSE, called variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD). Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease occurs spontaneously in humans. It is seen primarily in older patients and has a long degenerative period before death occurs.
However, vCJD occurs in much younger patients and the neurological degeneration occurs much more rapidly before death occurs.
In the incident mentioned above, only one animal in the U.S. was detected with BSE, and generally after a waiting period where intensive testing is performed to HHS by giving those agencies the authority to regulate biohazardous agents that threaten public health, animals, plants and products made from animals and plants. 13 The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was born from the HSPD-7, and established policy for enhanced protection of national critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR). 14 The NIPP delineates the roles and responsibilities for all participants in protecting critical infrastructure. The USDA's responsibilities include agriculture and meat, poultry and egg products. The Department of Health and Human
Services is responsible for food other than meat, poultry and egg products.
The National Response Plan and the subsequent National Response Framework also delineate the responsibilities of the USDA and HHS in the event of a food or agriculture incident. Other steps are being taken by federal agencies to better manage the risk of agroterrorism, including the development of standard protocols between 7 agencies; conducting test exercises and vulnerability assessments; creating laboratory networks and working groups; development of a National Veterinary Stockpile of vaccines needed to respond to animal diseases; and funding of research addressing issues related to agroterrorism.
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There are many challenges associated with responding to an agricultural incident, whether it is a natural outbreak or an intentional incident. They include lack of personnel able to recognize a foreign animal disease outbreak, difficulty with vaccination and vaccination stockpiling, and difficulty detecting a covert attack and differentiating it from a natural outbreak with the current surveillance and diagnostic methods available.
Early reporting of an outbreak of an animal or plant disease is essential to controlling it. Because of the current methods of farming and processing of food products, including transportation, if there are not enough personnel trained to recognize the significant diseases, the illness can spread rapidly. Foreign animal disease diagnosticians are essential as part of the initial investigation in an animal disease outbreak. According to the 2005 GAO report, there are not enough veterinarians trained to recognize these diseases. 16 In addition there are significantly decreased numbers of people entering the veterinary profession, especially food animal husbandry, with a resulting decrease in the emphasis of teaching about foreign animal diseases in veterinary school curricula. 17 Another aspect of educating professionals to recognize specific disease symptoms is that the pathology of the disease needs to be understood. This will enable prompt, effective treatment. This is true of the veterinary and plant pathologist communities, as well as human doctors dealing with a potentially 8 zoonotic disease. In the anthrax cases of 2001, one lesson learned was that there was an insufficient knowledge about the pathology and subsequent effective treatment of the disease caused by anthrax, leading to excessive use of antibiotic therapy. 18 This resulted in a very costly treatment severely decreasing available supplies of medication.
In the United States, surveillance for the presence of unusual diseases or an increase in the number of cases of an endemic disease is done with a passive system.
The farmer is usually the first to recognize that he might have a problem on his farm. These tests are real-time and fairly quick to perform, but it does require specialized training to prepare samples and to interpret results. Also, environmental contamination is possible unless specific cautionary measures are taken.
The movement of food products, animals and animal products throughout the processing system is dramatic. At this time, "there is no effective system for ensuring rapid government access to critical traceback information." 25 Animal tracking requirements are poor and often records of sale are poor or absent. 26 Traceback and tracking are important to determine the origin of an outbreak, enabling the investigator to determine if the disease started in one location or multiple locations. Determination of the initial case can help determine if the outbreak is natural or intentional, and how many animals have been exposed.
Another issue in the nation's surveillance system is that there are fewer inspections and interceptions by agricultural inspectors at some ports of entry into the U.S. 27 When the DHS was created, the agricultural inspectors who were originally supervised by the USDA, became DHS assets. To maintain flexibility in the immigration and importation inspections, all of these inspectors are cross-trained to perform other responsibilities, and might then be unavailable to perform agricultural inspections.
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Sometimes information about high-risk cargo that is entering the country does not flow to the inspectors in a timely manner, allowing some shipments of questionable cargo to miss inspection. Stockpiling enough vaccine is difficult, due to short-shelf life, and vaccines are often stored in concentrated form, requiring reconstitution prior to use.
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The biggest challenge to responding to a major agricultural incident is coordination between the key stakeholders. The 2005 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report cites weaknesses in the flow of critical information including the creation of a response plan that is unrealistic regarding the ability of states' capabilities; after action reports are not being shared systematically among the key players; states and industry 11 are not receiving national guidance in a timely manner; and insufficient guidance to states to allocate homeland security grant funding for agriculture. 31 The 2008 GAO Emergency Management Report demonstrating the preparedness of DHS to respond to a catastrophic event still describes a need to better integrate stakeholders into the planning and development of national policies and guidelines. 32 For example, "key nonfederal stakeholders, such as state and local governments, were not directly involved in developing the National Pandemic Strategy and Implementation Plan, even though these stakeholders are expected to be primary responders to an influenza pandemic.
33
In the case of an avian influenza/pandemic influenza outbreak, there are many shared leadership roles and responsibilities, and additional bureaucratic positions through the chain of command, making the leadership structure even more complex and uncertain. 34 It has also been noted that the communication between agricultural producers and state emergency management regulators can be confusing and rudimentary with a lack of guidelines designating the appropriate contacts in the case of a serious infectious disease outbreak. 35 Communication must be considered, and can be included as part of coordination.
This also includes public awareness announcements. One lesson learned on a repeated basis demonstrates the need to have accurate, rapid information given to media sources, to reassure the public that steps are being taken to alleviate or eradicate the situation.
The United States has not experienced a major agricultural incident, but there are many natural disasters, food-borne illness outbreaks, and training exercises that demonstrate the confusion between emergency responders. Top official (TOPOFF)
exercises are designed to test and improve emergency preparedness and response management at the top levels of state, federal and international governments, with the lessons learned demonstrating the measurements of decision making at the tactical level. 36 A repeated lesson learned from these exercises is that the emergency operations centers often feel disconnected from the incident command level resulting in a breakdown of information flow and integration between the two levels. 37 The after action report from TOPOFF 4 also found that multiple unified commands had no standard command structures, limiting coordination and communication to all levels.
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The TOPOFF 4 lesson demonstrated a common complaint found after many disaster response exercises or real life experiences. An analysis of the anthrax attacks
showed that there was a lack of a clear chain of command that slowed the management and clean-up processes. 39 One of the lessons learned from the Special Event Food
Defense Assignment (SEFDA), an effort to prepare for the protection of food served during the political party conventions and to develop a template for future events, was that participants were unclear on what roles they would play. 40 An excellent example of how important interagency coordination is in responding to an agricultural incident is the response to a major food-borne illness outbreak. In 2008. In that time period over 1400 persons were infected, with a common feeling that underreporting makes the final number of infected persons much higher. 41 In early June, the FDA initially reported that certain types of raw tomatoes were the culprit produce. In July, the FDA reported that tomatoes were not suspect, that the produce in information. 45 When the FDA was approached about the delay in reporting data and confirmation of cases, the reason given was the response capacity was strained. Other questions that arise from this episode are how quickly is data shared between agencies;
is relevant data being fully shared; and is initial lab work being reviewed and shared between agencies? All these relate to coordination and communication issues.
This outbreak also demonstrated a dichotomy between the epidemiological investigation and the traceback investigation. The CDC conducts epidemiological 14 investigations and the FDA is responsible for traceback scrutiny, and they are treated as two separate processes. 46 As a result, significant integration between agencies is required. In addition, there are no standard protocols for collection and analysis of epidemiological data and conflicting interests and policies within federal agencies often obstruct flow of information and data. what information needed to be communicated to the public and possible even about the level of risk posed to them. 48 Additional inconsistencies were provided to the media as a result of differing organizational policies and standards associated with confidentiality and legal restrictions. 49 The United States government has taken many steps to ensure a rapid, effective response in the case of a major catastrophe. It included food and agricultural incidents in those plans, but despite many mandates, exercises, and natural outbreaks enabling training, the lessons learned are often repeated. The government is able to recognize when a problem exists and responds with new policies and reforms. "Too often, we declare victory as soon as the ink of the president's signature is dry. Too often, we neglect the job of making things work." 50 Coordination and communication between all key stakeholders responding to a major agricultural incident will be essential to prevent tremendous financial loss and 15 political unrest. There is a need for a unified command, or one that ensures that key decision makers are on the same page, as well as a clear chain of command among decision makers. 51 All key stakeholders must be involved in the process, from planning to execution. This includes all local, state and federal government agencies, as well as private industry. If vaccine production is to be increased in the event of a pandemic incident or an outbreak of a foreign animal disease, the companies producing that vaccine should be included in the planning and training exercises, at least to determine capabilities in an emergency event. Also, there is an abundance of technical expertise in private industry and academia that can and should be called on to assist in an emergency event. If it is determined that these people will be asked to participate, they should also be part of the planning process. This will ensure the logistical considerations are considered and prevent surprises for everyone.
There are positive examples of multiple organizations working together in a crisis situation. On September 11, the agencies around and within the Pentagon agreed in advance who would be in charge in case of a major incident. 52 "They worked effectively in a tightly knit horizontal network instead of struggling over a vertical chain of command." 53 In Alamosa County, Colorado, there was a large Salmonella outbreak from contaminated water. There were multiple local and state organizations working together to ensure the public health safety of the community involved, including private utilities and wastewater management companies. The reasons given for the success of this operation was Colorado's Water/Wastewater Agency Response Network (COWARN), a web-based mutual-aid system for water and wastewater emergencies; the housing of state public health and environmental staff in one agency, presenting a unified approach; and preparedness funding and emergency preparedness exercises. 54 Another incident with a positive outcome was an incident in Wisconsin where the local police were notified anonymously that feed products at a rendering plant were contaminated with a pesticide and it would lead to large-scale animal mortality. State and federal agencies were notified of the potential problem, and samples from the rendering plant were analyzed. Records were reviewed to determine the extent of the problem. It was discovered that chlordane had been added to the liquid fat, and that about 4000 farmers had been sent contaminated product in four different states. 55 Additionally, milk from these farms had been sent to many dairy plants to be process further. State and federal agencies became involved and within two days, all major customers were notified and the feed replaced. 56 In this case, even though there was a coordinated response there was still an estimated value of $4 million worth of product disposal. If vaccine stockpiling is to be pursued, close coordination with private industry is essential. The industry will be expected to increase production substantially if necessary. When stockpiled vaccines expire prior to use, industry will be expected to provide updated stock. For these reasons, the pharmaceutical industry producing vaccines becomes a key stakeholder, and should be consulted when making emergency response plans.
There are many positive things happening to protect the nation's agricultural and food production infrastructure. In the case of a major agricultural incident however, it is questionable whether the nation will be able to respond in an efficient and timely manner. The main problem, and one that is repeated in after action reviews from exercises and natural disaster experiences, is the lack of coordination and communication between the multiple agencies expected to respond. There must be continued diligence from the leadership of all those agencies to involve all key stakeholders expected to participate in the first response in an agricultural emergency.
In addition, training needs to follow planning at all levels, including the strategic level, to develop an understanding of who is in charge, and the capabilities of all parties. Only then can an effective response happen in the event of an agroterrorist event.
